Going for it on 4th & 2, down 10-0
This board has crucified Wells for kicking in similar situations last year. I have specifically seen it held out on RRS as a certainty that Wells' decision to kick on 4th & goal from the 9 yard line v KSU last year cost us the game. That's nutty.
We were 10 pt dogs and down by 10 points. I'm on board with being aggressive in this spot 100%.
Plus, by going for it so deep into TCU's territory, we used the positive field position to kick a FG two possessions later. It's highly unlikely we kick the FG before half if we had not gone for it two possessions earlier and forced TCU to start a drive at their own 7 yard line.
Going for 2 to make it a 9-point game
I like this. NFL teams do this all the time for good reason. When you are down by 14 or 17, and there are only 2-3 possessions left in the game, you go for 2 after scoring your first TD. It gives you a chance of winning in regulation. If you don't convert, you go for 2 again on your 2nd TD. And if you don't convert that, you know you need to score a TD on your third possession. Here's the long version.
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It makes even more sense to do this when you are a 10 point underdog and are,, therefore, less likely to win a game in OT. Doing what we did provided us a chance to win the game in regulation, instead of a chance to win the game in overtime.
Kicking the Field Goal
There is no defending this decision. We were solely motivated by saving time. Yet, from the time our offense could have ran a 2nd down play, to the time we snapped it to kick the FG, right around 22 seconds ran off the clock. That means we wasted roughly 13% of the remaining time left in the game to do something that gave us a lower chance of winning. Insanity.
There is no reason not to run two plays there before attempting the FG. But if we're going to do something stupid like kick short of 4th down, why not spike the ball on 2nd down and save 20+ seconds. And then maybe you throw it in the end zone on 3rd and 4.
Wells' purported reasons for kicking the field goal immediately does not make me feel any better about the decision:
(1) he knew we needed to kick a FG to win the game anyways, so why not get it out of the way. This is obviously not true. Scoring two TDs would also win the game. There was no requirement that we win by kicking a FG first (or second) and scoring a TD.
(2) In a prior game, Wells lost in a similar spot after he threw a few balls into the endzone when all he needed was a FG to keep hope alive in the game. This is horrible logic. If you're in this situation (deciding whether to kick a FG early), you're very, very likely to lose the game. So relying on the fact that a particular strategy failed in one instance should have very little influence on whether or not to use that same strategy moving forward.
If you're going to do what we did on Saturday, you better have done the math and know this to be true:
(1) chances of winning if you are down by 6 and kicking off with 2:50 seconds left,
>
(2) chances of winning down by 9 and it's 2nd & 4 with 3:15 seconds left on the 19 yard line.
That's all there is to consider here. The only reason to kick a FG is if you think (1) is higher than (2), and you better damn sure have run the numbers on it before making the decision that we ultimately made.
As mentioned above, if (1) gave us a higher chance of winning, we should've spiked the ball on 2nd down with over 3 minutes left in the game. So, even if a world existed where the best move was immediately kicking a FG, we still didn't go about it in a way that gave us the highest chance of winning the game.
This board has crucified Wells for kicking in similar situations last year. I have specifically seen it held out on RRS as a certainty that Wells' decision to kick on 4th & goal from the 9 yard line v KSU last year cost us the game. That's nutty.
We were 10 pt dogs and down by 10 points. I'm on board with being aggressive in this spot 100%.
Plus, by going for it so deep into TCU's territory, we used the positive field position to kick a FG two possessions later. It's highly unlikely we kick the FG before half if we had not gone for it two possessions earlier and forced TCU to start a drive at their own 7 yard line.
Going for 2 to make it a 9-point game
I like this. NFL teams do this all the time for good reason. When you are down by 14 or 17, and there are only 2-3 possessions left in the game, you go for 2 after scoring your first TD. It gives you a chance of winning in regulation. If you don't convert, you go for 2 again on your 2nd TD. And if you don't convert that, you know you need to score a TD on your third possession. Here's the long version.
Going for 2 down 8 points: Packers pull off come-from-behind win thanks to this strategy
The Packers profited from being the first team this season to try this unconventional 2-point conversion attempt. Here's why others should follow their lead.
It makes even more sense to do this when you are a 10 point underdog and are,, therefore, less likely to win a game in OT. Doing what we did provided us a chance to win the game in regulation, instead of a chance to win the game in overtime.
Kicking the Field Goal
There is no defending this decision. We were solely motivated by saving time. Yet, from the time our offense could have ran a 2nd down play, to the time we snapped it to kick the FG, right around 22 seconds ran off the clock. That means we wasted roughly 13% of the remaining time left in the game to do something that gave us a lower chance of winning. Insanity.
There is no reason not to run two plays there before attempting the FG. But if we're going to do something stupid like kick short of 4th down, why not spike the ball on 2nd down and save 20+ seconds. And then maybe you throw it in the end zone on 3rd and 4.
Wells' purported reasons for kicking the field goal immediately does not make me feel any better about the decision:
(1) he knew we needed to kick a FG to win the game anyways, so why not get it out of the way. This is obviously not true. Scoring two TDs would also win the game. There was no requirement that we win by kicking a FG first (or second) and scoring a TD.
(2) In a prior game, Wells lost in a similar spot after he threw a few balls into the endzone when all he needed was a FG to keep hope alive in the game. This is horrible logic. If you're in this situation (deciding whether to kick a FG early), you're very, very likely to lose the game. So relying on the fact that a particular strategy failed in one instance should have very little influence on whether or not to use that same strategy moving forward.
If you're going to do what we did on Saturday, you better have done the math and know this to be true:
(1) chances of winning if you are down by 6 and kicking off with 2:50 seconds left,
>
(2) chances of winning down by 9 and it's 2nd & 4 with 3:15 seconds left on the 19 yard line.
That's all there is to consider here. The only reason to kick a FG is if you think (1) is higher than (2), and you better damn sure have run the numbers on it before making the decision that we ultimately made.
As mentioned above, if (1) gave us a higher chance of winning, we should've spiked the ball on 2nd down with over 3 minutes left in the game. So, even if a world existed where the best move was immediately kicking a FG, we still didn't go about it in a way that gave us the highest chance of winning the game.
