The only people upset by this are Islamists and leftists. Now what should that tell you about these folks?
India Gives Israel a Firm Embrace
Modi’s visit reflects a deep realignment in India’s domestic politics.
Sadanand DhumeJuly 6, 2017 1:28 p.m. ET
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, left, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on on Wednesday. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
By
Sadanand Dhume
Even to the casual observer, the symbolism of Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel this week was hard to miss. But the visit also reflects deep changes in India’s domestic politics. Traditional opponents of a closer India-Israel relationship have lost in the court of public opinion.
Mr. Modi’s three days in Israel, the first visit ever to the Jewish state by an Indian prime minister, unfolded as a series of carefully choreographed photo-ops designed to emphasize the warmth that exists between New Delhi and Jerusalem. Accompanied by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Mr. Modi paid tribute to Holocaust victims and to Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism.
The two leaders underlined their common opposition to Islamic terrorism by meeting a 10-year-old Israeli boy whose parents were murdered by Pakistani terrorists during the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which claimed 166 lives. Mr. Modi also traveled to Haifa to honor Indian soldiers who died helping liberate the city during World War I.
It’s easy to attribute India’s dramatic shift over the past quarter century—from reflexive support for the Palestinians to an intense partnership with Israel—to changing global circumstances.
As the argument goes, the collapse of the Soviet Union led India to warm to Israel, in part as a bridge to the U.S. Common concerns about Islamic terrorism boosted intelligence sharing between the two countries. India’s appetite for high-tech weapons, and Israel’s willingness to sell them, spawned a robust defense-trade relationship. The rise of Bangalore and Tel Aviv as global technology hubs—and their common links with Silicon Valley—deepened commercial ties. The discovery of India by legions of Israeli backpackers decompressing after compulsory military service aided tourism and created mutual goodwill.
All this is true enough, but it overlooks a larger point. Mr. Modi’s groundbreaking visit to Israel was possible in part because the Indian prime minister is on the winning side of a debate at home about the Jewish state.
The left-leaning leaders of India in the early decades of independence showed no love for Israel. While his country was still a British colony, Jawaharlal Nehru opposed the 1917 Balfour declaration in which the British opened the door to a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.
Three decades later, after Nehru became prime minister, India opposed the 1948 creation of Israel at the United Nations. New Delhi only recognized the Jewish state in 1950, and didn’t establish full diplomatic relations until more than four decades later.
Both international considerations and domestic politics shaped India’s stance. Opposition to Israel gave India a convenient platform for moral grandstanding. It also ensured that New Delhi remained on the right side of the oil-rich Arabs. But behind India’s rhetoric about solidarity with the Palestinians also lay a less high-minded consideration: not running afoul of the orthodox Islamic clerics who claimed to influence the votes of India’s large Muslim minority.
Only in 1992, with New Delhi’s foreign policy of nonalignment overtaken by the collapse of the Soviet Union, did India establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. P.V. Narasimha Rao, the prime minister at the time, may have belonged to the Congress Party, but he was no member of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty.
Almost immediately, cooperation in defense, agriculture and counterterrorism began to grow dramatically. After the right-of-center Bharatiya Janata Party government took power in 1998, the process only accelerated. In 2003, Ariel Sharon became the first (and, so far, only) Israeli prime minister to visit India. But India’s old habit of being overly sensitive to perceived Muslim opinion—there’s little evidence that Indian-Muslim voters care inordinately about this issue—still persisted.
Led by Sonia Gandhi, Nehru’s granddaughter-in-law, the Congress Party reclaimed power in 2004. That didn’t end cooperation with Israel, but the new government halted its most public aspects. During the party’s 10 years in power, from 2004 to 2014, bilateral visits at the prime ministerial and presidential level between India and Israel were frozen. India didn’t want to forego the benefits of a friendship with Israel, but it didn’t want to flaunt that friendship, either.
In hindsight, the Congress Party made a mistake. Many middle-class Indians view Israel not as the neocolonial oppressor of caricature, but as Americans do: A plucky country surrounded by dangerous neighbors that has thrived against the odds.
Some are also attracted to Jewish civilization because, like Hinduism, it predates Islam and Christianity. A 2009 survey by the Israeli Foreign Ministry found India to be the most pro-Israel of those countries surveyed, ahead even of the U.S.
Close ties with Israel make sense to middle-class Indians. They resent the idea of giving India’s 14% Muslim minority a veto over an important bilateral relationship. The notion of slowing down or underplaying India-Israel ties out of deference to either pan-Islamic sentiment world-wide or domestic Muslim sentiment finds few takers outside India’s rapidly dwindling Left.
Mr. Modi appears to have grasped this fact. By publicly embracing Israel—and literally embracing Mr. Netanyahu about a half-dozen times at last count—Mr. Modi has moved India-Israel ties firmly away from the shadows and into the spotlight. This is where they will likely remain.
Mr. Dhume is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and a columnist for WSJ.com.
India Gives Israel a Firm Embrace
Modi’s visit reflects a deep realignment in India’s domestic politics.
Sadanand DhumeJuly 6, 2017 1:28 p.m. ET
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, left, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on on Wednesday. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
By
Sadanand Dhume
Even to the casual observer, the symbolism of Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel this week was hard to miss. But the visit also reflects deep changes in India’s domestic politics. Traditional opponents of a closer India-Israel relationship have lost in the court of public opinion.
Mr. Modi’s three days in Israel, the first visit ever to the Jewish state by an Indian prime minister, unfolded as a series of carefully choreographed photo-ops designed to emphasize the warmth that exists between New Delhi and Jerusalem. Accompanied by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Mr. Modi paid tribute to Holocaust victims and to Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism.
The two leaders underlined their common opposition to Islamic terrorism by meeting a 10-year-old Israeli boy whose parents were murdered by Pakistani terrorists during the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which claimed 166 lives. Mr. Modi also traveled to Haifa to honor Indian soldiers who died helping liberate the city during World War I.
It’s easy to attribute India’s dramatic shift over the past quarter century—from reflexive support for the Palestinians to an intense partnership with Israel—to changing global circumstances.
As the argument goes, the collapse of the Soviet Union led India to warm to Israel, in part as a bridge to the U.S. Common concerns about Islamic terrorism boosted intelligence sharing between the two countries. India’s appetite for high-tech weapons, and Israel’s willingness to sell them, spawned a robust defense-trade relationship. The rise of Bangalore and Tel Aviv as global technology hubs—and their common links with Silicon Valley—deepened commercial ties. The discovery of India by legions of Israeli backpackers decompressing after compulsory military service aided tourism and created mutual goodwill.
All this is true enough, but it overlooks a larger point. Mr. Modi’s groundbreaking visit to Israel was possible in part because the Indian prime minister is on the winning side of a debate at home about the Jewish state.
The left-leaning leaders of India in the early decades of independence showed no love for Israel. While his country was still a British colony, Jawaharlal Nehru opposed the 1917 Balfour declaration in which the British opened the door to a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.
Three decades later, after Nehru became prime minister, India opposed the 1948 creation of Israel at the United Nations. New Delhi only recognized the Jewish state in 1950, and didn’t establish full diplomatic relations until more than four decades later.
Both international considerations and domestic politics shaped India’s stance. Opposition to Israel gave India a convenient platform for moral grandstanding. It also ensured that New Delhi remained on the right side of the oil-rich Arabs. But behind India’s rhetoric about solidarity with the Palestinians also lay a less high-minded consideration: not running afoul of the orthodox Islamic clerics who claimed to influence the votes of India’s large Muslim minority.
Only in 1992, with New Delhi’s foreign policy of nonalignment overtaken by the collapse of the Soviet Union, did India establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. P.V. Narasimha Rao, the prime minister at the time, may have belonged to the Congress Party, but he was no member of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty.
Almost immediately, cooperation in defense, agriculture and counterterrorism began to grow dramatically. After the right-of-center Bharatiya Janata Party government took power in 1998, the process only accelerated. In 2003, Ariel Sharon became the first (and, so far, only) Israeli prime minister to visit India. But India’s old habit of being overly sensitive to perceived Muslim opinion—there’s little evidence that Indian-Muslim voters care inordinately about this issue—still persisted.
Led by Sonia Gandhi, Nehru’s granddaughter-in-law, the Congress Party reclaimed power in 2004. That didn’t end cooperation with Israel, but the new government halted its most public aspects. During the party’s 10 years in power, from 2004 to 2014, bilateral visits at the prime ministerial and presidential level between India and Israel were frozen. India didn’t want to forego the benefits of a friendship with Israel, but it didn’t want to flaunt that friendship, either.
In hindsight, the Congress Party made a mistake. Many middle-class Indians view Israel not as the neocolonial oppressor of caricature, but as Americans do: A plucky country surrounded by dangerous neighbors that has thrived against the odds.
Some are also attracted to Jewish civilization because, like Hinduism, it predates Islam and Christianity. A 2009 survey by the Israeli Foreign Ministry found India to be the most pro-Israel of those countries surveyed, ahead even of the U.S.
Close ties with Israel make sense to middle-class Indians. They resent the idea of giving India’s 14% Muslim minority a veto over an important bilateral relationship. The notion of slowing down or underplaying India-Israel ties out of deference to either pan-Islamic sentiment world-wide or domestic Muslim sentiment finds few takers outside India’s rapidly dwindling Left.
Mr. Modi appears to have grasped this fact. By publicly embracing Israel—and literally embracing Mr. Netanyahu about a half-dozen times at last count—Mr. Modi has moved India-Israel ties firmly away from the shadows and into the spotlight. This is where they will likely remain.
Mr. Dhume is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and a columnist for WSJ.com.
