Oh well. I wonder what the new left wing extremist narrative is going to be? Just kidding! Who cares what those dumbfücks think.
How Trump Became a Russia Skeptic
The conventional wisdom about a Kremlin-friendly White House is dated. Reality forced a change.
By
Adrian Karatnycky
April 3, 2017 7:22 p.m. ET
Photo: Phil Foster
A Kremlin spokesman told ABC News on Friday that despite the new administration in Washington, Russian-American relations remain “at the lowest possible point.” Yet the spokesman also suggested that if Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin were to meet in person “there will be chance for our volatile relations to get better.”
These are telling remarks, given that only a few months ago Mr. Putin was salivating at the thought of a Trump presidency. Mr. Trump had extolled the Russian leader, declared the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “obsolete,” and hinted that the U.S. might accept Russia’s annexation of Crimea. A few years ago Steve Bannon, an influential Trump adviser, promoted the idea of a grand alliance between the West and a traditionalist Russia against secularism and Islam. Mike Flynn, a Putin-friendly recipient of Moscow’s largess, was appointed national security adviser.
Yet as the investigations continue into Trumpworld’s Russia connections, the White House has replaced these friendly soundings with a sober, decidedly hawkish stance.
As the atmosphere shifts, Russia’s state-controlled and state-directed media have begun to turn against Mr. Trump, suggesting that Moscow no longer expects a cooperative relationship. Gazeta.ru, a Kremlin mouthpiece, called Mr. Trump a narcissist not long after he took office. Another, Lenta.ru, announced in February the “end of illusions” about a warming in relations, reporting that some of President Trump’s “most ardent boosters” in the Russian media were turning on him. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev told Russian television viewers to expect the international sanctions on their country to remain in place “indefinitely.”
The shift has moved beyond rhetoric: Mr. Putin has escalated violence in eastern Ukraine. Since early February, his proxies and fighters have dropped significant amounts of missiles and ordnance on towns and cities in the Donbas region. Moscow has deployed a new cruise missile in violation of treaty obligations. And Russian pilots have resumed the practice of buzzing U.S. ships deployed in the Black Sea.
Mr. Trump’s friendly comments toward Mr. Putin have also brought resistance from a unique coalition: Republican hawks, Democrats angry over Russia’s election meddling, the national-security establishment and intelligence community, and key European leaders. Together they have applied enough pressure to profoundly shift administration policy. For one thing, the president was compelled by the weight of evidence to acknowledge in January that Russian hacking had indeed influenced the American political process, even as he insisted this interference did not affect the election’s outcome.
The expert consensus about Mr. Putin is so negative that Mr. Trump couldn’t have put together a Kremlin-friendly national-security team even if he had tried. As a result, serious-minded Russia hawks are emerging in key posts. When Mr. Flynn was forced to resign as national security adviser, H.R. McMaster took his place. The appointment of Putin critic Fiona Hill to be the National Security Council’s Russia expert is pending.
Mr. Trump’s most senior appointees, including the vice president and defense secretary, began criticizing Russian actions almost immediately after taking office. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley made clear that America will continue to back Ukraine. Last week Mr. Tillerson declared that the U.S. and its allies would remain “steadfast” in their “support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” A senior government official in Kiev told me that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has been reassured by his direct discussions with Mr. Trump.
Sanctions against Russia over its annexation of Crimea and occupation of eastern Ukraine have also been reaffirmed. Mr. Trump has proposed a $54 billion increase in Washington’s defense budget. He has made clear that he wants NATO allies to significantly boost their own military spending. These moves cannot be welcome in Moscow.
The idea that Mr. Trump could strike some sort of grand bargain with Mr. Putin isn’t dead. Questions remain about whether Mr. Trump or some of his advisers may be vulnerable to Russian blackmail. But so far the White House has proved more susceptible to the pressures that come from press scrutiny, congressional oversight and the elite consensus.
Mr. Trump’s early view of Moscow as potentially a close ally has been routed. The president is now beginning to articulate a policy toward Russia rooted in American strength, albeit with predictable digs at his White House predecessor. He tweeted last month: “For eight years Russia ‘ran over’ President Obama, got stronger and stronger, picked-off Crimea and added missiles. Weak!”
The bad news for Mr. Putin doesn’t stop there. Despite Brexit, the U.K. seems to be taking a hard line, with Prime Minister Theresa May and Foreign Minister Boris Johnson championing Ukraine’s interests. In Germany’s election this September, voters will choose between Angela Merkel, the tough-minded chancellor, and Martin Schulz, a Social Democrat with a record of criticizing Mr. Putin. In France, the likely winner in May’s presidential runoff appears to be the pro-European centrist Emanuel Macron, who is comfortably ahead of two pro-Russian candidates from the right.
The American investigations remain critical. All leads concerning Russian cyberattacks on U.S. political targets should be investigated. Any contacts between Trump campaign advisers and Russia should be followed up. Potential vulnerabilities of administration personnel should be fully explored. But it’s also important to understand that Russia’s effort to gain an advantage from meddling in the election appears to have abjectly failed.
American institutions are working well. The security policies that were shaped in the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War remain firmly in place. Although it’s unlikely that Mr. Putin helped swing the vote in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin or Michigan, his hapless meddling appears only to have awakened American and European hawkishness.
Mr. Karatnycky is co-director of the Ukraine in Europe Initiative at the Atlantic Council.
Appeared in the Apr. 04, 2017, print edition.
How Trump Became a Russia Skeptic
The conventional wisdom about a Kremlin-friendly White House is dated. Reality forced a change.
By
Adrian Karatnycky
April 3, 2017 7:22 p.m. ET
Photo: Phil Foster
A Kremlin spokesman told ABC News on Friday that despite the new administration in Washington, Russian-American relations remain “at the lowest possible point.” Yet the spokesman also suggested that if Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin were to meet in person “there will be chance for our volatile relations to get better.”
These are telling remarks, given that only a few months ago Mr. Putin was salivating at the thought of a Trump presidency. Mr. Trump had extolled the Russian leader, declared the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “obsolete,” and hinted that the U.S. might accept Russia’s annexation of Crimea. A few years ago Steve Bannon, an influential Trump adviser, promoted the idea of a grand alliance between the West and a traditionalist Russia against secularism and Islam. Mike Flynn, a Putin-friendly recipient of Moscow’s largess, was appointed national security adviser.
Yet as the investigations continue into Trumpworld’s Russia connections, the White House has replaced these friendly soundings with a sober, decidedly hawkish stance.
As the atmosphere shifts, Russia’s state-controlled and state-directed media have begun to turn against Mr. Trump, suggesting that Moscow no longer expects a cooperative relationship. Gazeta.ru, a Kremlin mouthpiece, called Mr. Trump a narcissist not long after he took office. Another, Lenta.ru, announced in February the “end of illusions” about a warming in relations, reporting that some of President Trump’s “most ardent boosters” in the Russian media were turning on him. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev told Russian television viewers to expect the international sanctions on their country to remain in place “indefinitely.”
The shift has moved beyond rhetoric: Mr. Putin has escalated violence in eastern Ukraine. Since early February, his proxies and fighters have dropped significant amounts of missiles and ordnance on towns and cities in the Donbas region. Moscow has deployed a new cruise missile in violation of treaty obligations. And Russian pilots have resumed the practice of buzzing U.S. ships deployed in the Black Sea.
Mr. Trump’s friendly comments toward Mr. Putin have also brought resistance from a unique coalition: Republican hawks, Democrats angry over Russia’s election meddling, the national-security establishment and intelligence community, and key European leaders. Together they have applied enough pressure to profoundly shift administration policy. For one thing, the president was compelled by the weight of evidence to acknowledge in January that Russian hacking had indeed influenced the American political process, even as he insisted this interference did not affect the election’s outcome.
The expert consensus about Mr. Putin is so negative that Mr. Trump couldn’t have put together a Kremlin-friendly national-security team even if he had tried. As a result, serious-minded Russia hawks are emerging in key posts. When Mr. Flynn was forced to resign as national security adviser, H.R. McMaster took his place. The appointment of Putin critic Fiona Hill to be the National Security Council’s Russia expert is pending.
Mr. Trump’s most senior appointees, including the vice president and defense secretary, began criticizing Russian actions almost immediately after taking office. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley made clear that America will continue to back Ukraine. Last week Mr. Tillerson declared that the U.S. and its allies would remain “steadfast” in their “support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” A senior government official in Kiev told me that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has been reassured by his direct discussions with Mr. Trump.
Sanctions against Russia over its annexation of Crimea and occupation of eastern Ukraine have also been reaffirmed. Mr. Trump has proposed a $54 billion increase in Washington’s defense budget. He has made clear that he wants NATO allies to significantly boost their own military spending. These moves cannot be welcome in Moscow.
The idea that Mr. Trump could strike some sort of grand bargain with Mr. Putin isn’t dead. Questions remain about whether Mr. Trump or some of his advisers may be vulnerable to Russian blackmail. But so far the White House has proved more susceptible to the pressures that come from press scrutiny, congressional oversight and the elite consensus.
Mr. Trump’s early view of Moscow as potentially a close ally has been routed. The president is now beginning to articulate a policy toward Russia rooted in American strength, albeit with predictable digs at his White House predecessor. He tweeted last month: “For eight years Russia ‘ran over’ President Obama, got stronger and stronger, picked-off Crimea and added missiles. Weak!”
The bad news for Mr. Putin doesn’t stop there. Despite Brexit, the U.K. seems to be taking a hard line, with Prime Minister Theresa May and Foreign Minister Boris Johnson championing Ukraine’s interests. In Germany’s election this September, voters will choose between Angela Merkel, the tough-minded chancellor, and Martin Schulz, a Social Democrat with a record of criticizing Mr. Putin. In France, the likely winner in May’s presidential runoff appears to be the pro-European centrist Emanuel Macron, who is comfortably ahead of two pro-Russian candidates from the right.
The American investigations remain critical. All leads concerning Russian cyberattacks on U.S. political targets should be investigated. Any contacts between Trump campaign advisers and Russia should be followed up. Potential vulnerabilities of administration personnel should be fully explored. But it’s also important to understand that Russia’s effort to gain an advantage from meddling in the election appears to have abjectly failed.
American institutions are working well. The security policies that were shaped in the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War remain firmly in place. Although it’s unlikely that Mr. Putin helped swing the vote in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin or Michigan, his hapless meddling appears only to have awakened American and European hawkishness.
Mr. Karatnycky is co-director of the Ukraine in Europe Initiative at the Atlantic Council.
Appeared in the Apr. 04, 2017, print edition.
